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When there are externalities across households, governments can
improve economic outcomes by equitably subsidizing education. But
t h i sc h a i no fc a u s a l i t yw o r k so n l yi f( a )a l l o c a t e dr e s o u r c e sr e a c ht h e
ﬁnal recepients and (b) equity in public subsidies translates directly
into equity in total educational expenditures, including private spend-
ing at the household level. Using a unique data set from Zambia, this
paper shows that whether these condtions are met depends on the
speciﬁc schemes used to allocate resources as well as the exact form of
the subsidies. First, subsidies allocated through clear guidelines and
legislated rules reached the ﬁnal recepients but those allocated at the
discretion of province and educational oﬃces did not. Second, even
those components of subsidies that were progressive (in that the share
of total subsidies to the poor was greater than the share of the non-
poor) had no eﬀect on inequality in total educational expenditures
due to the crowding out of household spending.
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1. Introduction
In the context of poverty traps and multiple equilibria, educational subsidies can provide the initial
impetus for shifting an economy to a desirable equilibrium (Banerjee 2003 and Galor and Zeira 1993).
Moreover, allocative equity can enhance allocative eﬃciency (Fernandez and Rogerson 1996 and Epple,
Filimon, and Romer 1984). Externalities in education result in concave returns for the social planner so that
higher equity in educational expenditures generates higher levels of welfare.
Apart from eﬃciency gains, there are strong moral and ethical reasons for supporting equality in edu-
cational expenditures. For instance, an important position on education in the United States argues that
“A system that allows the accidents of geography and birth to determine the quality of education received
by an individual is inimical to the idea of equal opportunity in the marketplace” (Fernandez and Rogerson
1996). Taken together these studies suggest that governments should subsidize educational expenditures and
to the extent that household expenditures on education are inherently unequal, governments should try to
attenuate the diﬀerences between rich and poor households through appropriate ﬁnancing programs.1
Consider a social planner seeking to maximize a welfare function that is concave in educational expendi-
tures, with a ﬁnancing constraint. Educational expenditures in turn are composed of government subsidies
and household (private) spending on education. The maximizing solution allocates government subsidies so
that total educational expenditure is equalized for every agent. What constraints does a government face in
delivering such an outcome? Three issues arise. First, government functionaries may not act as “benevolent”
entities when collecting taxes and distributing education subsidies (the “helping-hand” characterization of
the state). Frye and Shleifer (1997) for instance, argue for a “grabbing hand” view with independent bu-
reaucrats pursuing their own agenda. Policy implications diﬀer: under the grabbing-hand view, government
intervention may be less desirable than the constrained optimal obtained through the private market.
The second issue is the ability of the government to target expenditures at a disaggregated level. Although
ideally the government may wish to target educational subsidies to households, feasibility constraints restrict
what the government can and cannot do. In this case, a second-best scheme may be followed where targeting
is at the level of the school rather than the household. The success of such a scheme would then depend on
the distribution of wealth within and between schools. In particular, if all inequality is due to inequalities
between schools, there is no loss from targeting at the level of the school.
Household responses to government subsidies also matter. Generically, household spending on education
will depend both on its income and the amount of government transfers received. The eﬀect of government
transfers on overall inequality will therefore depend on the extent of crowding-out (or crowding-in) at diﬀerent
levels of the income distribution and the post-transfer distribution of educational expenditures may be very
diﬀerent from what would arise without any household responses.
This paper uses a unique data set on primary education from Zambia to examine these issues and the
following questions:2
1See Hoxby (1995) for a contrasting view on how equity in school subsidies may decrease eﬃciency in the context of assymetric
information.
2The data was collected by the author in collaboration with Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana and Pramila KrishnanEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 3
1. Do resources allocated by the central authority actually reach intended recipients (and if so, under
what conditions)?
2. Does school-based targeting adequately meet equity objectives?
3. Conditional on receipt, do such resources decrease inequalities in total educational expenditure?
Educational expenditures in Zambia (apart from teacher salaries–see below) are distributed through an
administrative hierarchy consisting of Provincial Educational Oﬃces and District Educational Oﬃces. The
survey data contain a detailed tracking of resources allocated by the government through this hierarchy to
schools as well as information on household assets of 20 randomly selected students from every school. This
paper uses the combination of expenditure tracking and school wealth to examine the ﬁrst two questions.
Moreover, the survey also contains data on educational expenditures of households matched to resources
received at the school that children in the household attend. This unique matched data is used to examine
household responses to government transfers.
The analysis is simpliﬁed by the speciﬁc resources that schools received during the survey year. Although
schools could receive three distinct types of inputs–in-kind receipts in the form of textbooks or chalk, staﬀ
salaries and cash grants–during the year of the survey, they received little in-kind inputs (on average less
than 0.05 textbooks, 0.012 desks, 0.001 chairs and 0.01 boxes of chalk per student).3 Moreover, teacher
remuneration was sent directly as payroll checks from the center to individual teachers eliminating any
potential for diversion. One can thus concentrate entirely on cash grants as the relevant government transfer.
The ﬁndings show that the success of government subsidies in reducing educational inequalities depends
on institutions, the structure of resource allocation, and the types of expenditures that the resources were
used for. Cash grants allocated through clear guidelines and rules reached schools in the earmarked fashion.
Moreover, due to the particular distribution of wealth within and across schools, targeting at the school
level was successful. The distribution was progressive with the poorest quintile receiving 30 percent of all
funds. In contrast, a much smaller percentage of cash grants allocated through the discretion of district
and provincial oﬃces reached schools and there is no evidence that these were allocated in a progressive
manner. Incorporating teacher salaries, the overall system of ﬁnancing is regressive, with the lowest 40
percent receiving less than 35 percent of overall funds allocated to schools.
This inequity in public ﬁnancing, however, is dwarfed by that in private (household) expenditures on
educational items with the poorest 40 percent spending less than 20 percent of the total. With these
high levels of inequality in household level expenditure, cash grants, which accounted for 30 percent of
total expenditures (including private spending) and were highly progressive could potentially serve as an
equalizing transfer. Unfortunately, these grants crowded out private household expenditure and the extent
of substitution was greater among the poor than the non-poor. Consequently the transfers had (at best) no
eﬀect on reducing inequality in overall educational expenditures.
3This was largely due to problems in the planning department of the Ministry of Education coupled with problems in
procurement, rather than due to the lack of funds (less than 60 percent of the allotted budget was actually used during the
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The results have important implications. In a ranking of 102 countries by Transparency International,
Zambia ranked 77th in the Corruption Perception Index scoring a low 2.6 out of a possible 10 (Transparency
International 2002). The ﬁndings imply that despite the poor structure of overall governance, resources can
be eﬃciently and equitably allocated to recipients if delivery mechanisms are well designed. Exactly the
same conclusions hold regarding the impact of subsidies on inequalities in educational expenditure. This
impact depends as much on what the subsidy is for as the amount of the subsidy itself. A ﬂexible form of
subsidy–unrestricted cash grants–have little eﬀect on inequality in total educational expenditures due to
the crowding out of household-level expenditures at all levels of income. One way to interpret these results
is that schools are constrained in what they can do and are hence unable to spend cash grants optimally.
These constraints could arise either due to thin markets (for instance in the case of teachers) or lack of scale
economies (for instance to improve infrastructure).
The work gains special relevance in the context of ﬁscal target setting under, for instance, the Millennium
Development Goals of international institutions such as the World Bank. The results suggest that ﬁscal
targets, while important, may not have the desired impacts unless careful consideration is given to the
patterns of disbursement and the types of expenditure that such programs entail. This paper mirrors the
results found in Das and others (2004) who examine the eﬃciency implications of the cash-grants in terms
of learning outcomes. They ﬁnd that anticipated cash grants (studied here) have no impact on learning
achievement. The results presented here suggests that these grants can be used as an eﬀective means of
targeting resources to the poor, but crowding out of household expenditures implies that there is no eﬀect
on the inequality of overall educational expenditures either.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and draws
a parallel to studies of beneﬁt incidence for public services. Section 3 presents a theoretical structure to
understand the relationship between school and household inputs. Sections 4 presents the data and Section
5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
This paper relates to three strands of the literature. The ﬁrst is research on beneﬁt incidence, the second
strand is work on the role of institutions and governance in determining outcomes and the third studies
household responses to subsidies provided by the government and other agencies.
2.1. BeneﬁtI n c i d e n c e
In a recent paper Van de Walle (2003) discusses diﬀerent approaches to evaluating the welfare impact
of a program. In the beneﬁt-incidence approach the costs of providing services are assumed to reﬂect the
beneﬁts received by the users. These costs are then ranked by welfare criteria to provide, for instance, the
extent of government spending on the poorest quintile in a given country. Since data is normally available
for a sub-sector (or at most, disaggregated by regions and sub-sectors) variation in the subsidy is entirely a
reﬂection of underlying variation in access to the service by diﬀerent population subgroups. For instance, the
cost of providing primary education might be computed for an entire country. Diﬀerences in the percentageEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 5
spent on the poor compared to the rich arise due to the number of poor and rich individuals who access
primary education.
According to van de Walle (1998, 2003), this approach suﬀers from several problems. First, constructing
the counterfactual welfare distribution in the absence of the program is key. Second, the implicit assump-
tion that costs of services directly reﬂect on beneﬁts is problematic if the marginal impact of spending has
diﬀerential eﬀects on welfare for diﬀerent individuals. This paper addresses the problems raised by Van de
Walle (2003) by using detailed micro level information on institutions and delivery mechanisms (for an earlier
example see Hammer and others 1995). The study argues that responses to government subsidies by house-
holds can be interpreted as causal, so that the “counterfactual” expenditure distribution is econometrically
identiﬁed. Second, it veriﬁes that the size of the subsidy does not reﬂect on beneﬁts, if beneﬁts are deﬁned
as proportional to total expenditure on education; it is acknowledged that this still does not fully address
the question of welfare since there could have been increased expenditure on other goods such as health.
2.2. Institutions and Outcomes
The second strand of literature, which relates to the role of institutions has been empirically examined
by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Frye and Shleifer (1997).
This work demonstrates that institutions matter. Burnside and Dollar (2000), for instance, show that
the eﬀectiveness of aid is tempered by the nature of governance in the country–eﬀectiveness is greater in
countries where governance indicators are better (for a more nuanced view see Easterly (2003)). Along a
similar vein, but at a more disaggregated level, Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Djankov and others (2002)
have studied property rights and the eﬀectiveness of courts. They ﬁnd that cross-country diﬀerentials in the
enforcement of such rights is associated with growth patterns across countries. Finally, Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001) address the problem of endogeneity in institutional variation across countries and show
that accounting for the endogeneity of institutional characteristics does not change the fundamental result
that institutions matter for economic outcomes.
While these studies all concentrate on diﬀerentials across countries, this paper shows that variation in
the design of allocation schemes within the country also matters. This view is closer to an older literature
on project design and more recent papers by Khwaja (2002) and Reinikka and Svensson (2002). Khwaja
(2002) shows that the degree to which projects are maintained depends as much on the characteristics of the
community as the design of the project. For instance, a project with higher community participation in the
construction phase was more likely to be well-maintained compared to a project with less participation in
t h es a m ec o m m u n i t y . Similarly, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) show that allocated resources are more likely
to reach schools if there is clear information regarding the amount distributed.
2.3. Household Responses
Finally, this study also relates to the literature on household responses to government subsidies. The
research on this front has examined labor supply decisions (Moﬃtt 1992, Ravallion and Datt 1995) and
private transfers to households (Cox and Jimenez 1995, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994) to ﬁnd that the eﬀectEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 6
of government subsidies is generally attenuated through the presence of household responses. There is,
however, a gap in the literature on household responses to school inputs, perhaps due to tricky sampling
issues. An exception is Jacoby (2002), who relates the caloric intake of children at home to calories provided
by a school feeding program. Jacoby (2002) shows that the school-feeding program had a “ﬂypaper” eﬀect
whereby extra calories at the school were not substituted away by decreased consumption at home. The
results presented here contrast with Jacoby’s, in that substitution vis-à-vis cash grants received by the school
are large and signiﬁcant.
3. A Simple Theoretical Structure
The following model structures the empirical results. To study the impact of government subsidies on
inequality in educational expenditure, the theory shows how the extent of substitution can diﬀer across the
rich and the poor, once we incorporate a production function for educational attainment into a household
optimization problem.4 With this approach, the budget constraint is non-linear so that the price implications
of an in increase in government subsidies can diﬀer for the rich and the poor.
Consider a household with one child that maximizes utility from two goods, education (E) and “other
goods“ (X), in a single period subject to a budget constraint. The household cannot spend directly on
education; education is determined through a production function, E = g(ws,z h), where ws are inputs at
the school level and zh are inputs at the household level. Thus, the household aﬀects education levels only
through its purchases of zh;ws must be provided by the government. The maximization problem is:
MaxU(E,X) s.t (1)
.E = g(ws,z h)
Y = zhPz + XPx.











The diﬀerence with a standard optimization problem is the inclusion of the additional term ∂E
∂zh,w h i c h
is interpreted as a price eﬀect in the following sense. Consider the eﬀect of consuming an additional unit of
X. The consumption of E g i v e nu pi nas t a n d a r dp r o b l e mi st h e nPx/PE and ﬁrst-order conditions imply
indiﬀerence in equilibrium between consuming an extra unit of X or E.O n c e E is determined through a
production function, however, the decrease in E is no longer given by the price ratio. As before, consuming
an additional unit of X will decrease consumption of zh by Px/Pz, but now this translates into a decrease
in E through the marginal product of zh at that particular point,g i v e nb y∂E/∂zh in Equation (2) above.
Incorporating a production function in the optimization framework implies that the budget constraint is no
4A model along the same lines is also presented in Brown (2003). However, we diﬀer from Brown (2003) in the speciﬁc
question asked. While Brown is interested in the relationship between parental education and child achievement, the central
issue here is the relationship between school and household inputs.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 7
longer (necessarily) linear–the additional X that can be consumed by forsaking one unit of zh will vary
with the level of zh.T h i si sc l a r i ﬁed in Figure 1.
The two panels in Figure 1 show the preference and the production function space. Since preferences
are deﬁned over E and X, indiﬀerence curves are derived in the usual fashion (assuming quasiconcavity of
U(.)). The budget set, however, is derived from the production function space. The isoquants in Panel B
correspond to a convex production set, where increases in zh at constant levels of w decreases the marginal
product of zh. This is directly reﬂected in the concavity of the budget constraint. At high levels of zh (and
therefore E), decreasing E leads to large increases in X, and this gain declines as the consumption of E
increases.
The second budget constraint (w>0) shows that increasing ws has the standard impact of an income
subsidy by shifting the budget constraint outwards. In addition though, there is also a price eﬀect measured
by the change in slope at any given X value. Household responses will then depend on the income eﬀect,
measured by movements along an Engle curve, and the price eﬀect reﬂecting a change in the implicit price
(measured by the change in the marginal product along the production function) of an increase in ws.5
T h en a t u r eo ft h ei n c o m ee ﬀect is well understood. If the marginal propensity to consume E out of
additional income decreases with income, poorer households will respond less to increases in ws than their
richer counterparts (so that there will be a larger increase in their overall educational spending). Thus,
increases in ws favor a more equitable distribution of educational expenditures, with the opposite result if
the marginal propensity to consume E rises with income.
To concentrate on the price eﬀect the rest of this section assumes that subsidies are externally ﬁnanced
externally (say through donors) and there are two types of agents, equally represented in the population, with
Cobb-Douglas preferences who diﬀer only in income–poor (Yp) a n dr i c h( Yr). With homothetic preferences,
in a standard optimization framework (without a built in production function) the expenditure share of the
poor compared to the rich is Yp/Yr (population proportions of rich and poor are the same) and the results
below can be interpreted as arising from the “pure” price eﬀect through the production function.
3.1. Example 1: Zero Price Eﬀects
Consider the following speciﬁcation of utility and the production function:
U(E,X)=EβX1−β (3)
E = ws + zh. (4)
In this formulation, ws and zh are perfect substitutes in the production function. This implies both that
isoquants are linear and that increases in ws have no eﬀect on the slope of the budget constraint–the price
eﬀect is eliminated. As expected with no price eﬀect, increases in ws are fully internalized as an increase
5An immediate question is the conditions under which the budget set is non-convex. Clearly, this happens if the marginal
product of zh increases in zh. Therefore, particular care needs to be taken to ensure that second-order conditions are met in
the maximization problem. In particular, some combinations of production and utility functions will display “all or nothing”
solutions.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 8
in income. Solving this program with the budget constraint and assuming for simplicity PX = Pzh =1 ,w e
have
z∗
h = β(Y + ws). (5)
Since the optimal solution when zh directly enters utility without a production function is given by
z∗
h = βY, ws serves only to augment income.
3.2. Example 2: Linear Isoquants with Price Eﬀects
Alternatively, with Equation (3) and the speciﬁcation
E = wszh (6)
isoquants are linear, but increases in ws increase the marginal product of zh by exactly the amount of the
subsidy (∂E/∂zh = ws). The complementarity of the two inputs in the production function implies that E
becomes cheaper with government subsidies. In this case the income eﬀect of the increase in ws combines
with the price eﬀect to leave z∗
h unaﬀected by the subsidy–all increases in ws translate directly into increases
in E.T h ee ﬀect of government subsidies on equity is now higher since household responses imply that the
full impact of ws is felt in total educational expenditures.
This suggests that greater substitutability between ws and zh, will decrease the eﬀect that such subsidies
have on equalizing total educational expenditures. This result is not entirely general. Consider the case of
Leonteif production functions. In this case zero government subsidies lead to a perfectly equitable distribution
of educational expenditures. This equality is retained with initial increases, but at higher-level subsidies
increase inequality (providing a shoe for the left foot to all individuals will increase inequality if the poor
cannot buy the matching pair, but the rich can). However, to the extent that ws and zh are “somewhat”
substitutable, the result holds and this is further explored in the next section.
3.3. Example 3: Simulations with Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Functions






where α ∈ [0,1] is the elasticity of substitution (α =1is the case given by Equation (4) above). The solution









To study the role of α, distributions of expenditures with Y ∼ N(5000,1500) and varying degrees of ws
and α are simulated. The simulations assume that ws is distributed equally to all agents and is therefore
wealth neutral.
Figure 2 shows the results of this simulation using concentration curves.6 The horizontal axis in all graphs
6The concentration curve is constructed by plotting the share of each population group against the welfare indicator. Thus,Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 9
is the income quintile and the vertical axis is the share of total expenditure (the line of perfect equality is the
450 line where spending shares are the same for every group). The graph on the upper left shows the eﬀect
of increasing government subsidies from ws =1 0 0to ws = 1000 for a production function characterized by
low substitutability (α =0 .1). The graph on the right then shows results from the same experiment for
a function where ws and zh are highly substitutable (α =1 ). Finally, the lower graphs show the eﬀect of
providing the same subsidy for production functions with diﬀerent degrees of substitutability.7 The ﬁgure
o nt h el e f ts h o w st h ee ﬀect of a subsidy of ws =5 0 0and the ﬁgure on the right for ws =1 0 0 0for α =0 .1
and 1.
Increasing government subsidies has a larger impact on equality in educational expenditures when the
elasticity of substitution is low. Increasing ws from 100 to 1000 (20 percent of the mean income) has no
discernible impact on inequality for α =1 , but almost doubles the share of the poorest 5 percent when
α =0 .1 (from 0.027 to 0.044). Moreover the gains from increasing government subsidies are much larger
when inputs have low substitutability. For instance, when α =0 .1, the government subsidy, ws =5 0 0
doubles the share of the poorest 5 percent compared to the same subsidy for an input with α =1 .T h i se ﬀect
increases with the size of the subsidy; if ws =1 0 0 0the increase in the share of the lowest quintile for a =0 .1












) is decreasing in α, so that providing inputs with lower substitutability renders a higher level
of utility for the social planner.
This framework shows that the extent to which government subsidies have an eﬀect on inequality depends
on the kind of input provided. In particular, there is no ap r i o r ireason to assume that government transfers
lead to higher substitution by the rich compared to the poor–this depends entirely on the structure of the
production function for education. In general, when inputs provided by the government are highly substi-
tutable in the production function there is little impact on inequality in the overall distribution of educational
expenditures; results are more positive when inputs provided have lower degrees of substitutability.
The discussion assumes that the allocated grants actually reach schools. Whether or not this happens
depends on a number of factors discussed for instance in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and Reinikka and
Svensson (2002). The results on this front are descriptive, emphasizing the importance of the design aspect
in delivery schemes.






Typically wealth quintiles or deciles are used to deﬁne the population group.




2s]1/γ and the government choosing whether to
provide w1s or w2s.I fw1s =0 , we have a CES production function with elasticity γ,a n di fw2s =0 , the elasticity is α.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 10
4. Data
4.1. The Country Context: Education in Zambia
The data for this study are from Zambia, a landlocked country with a population of 10 million, almost
entirely dependant on copper for export revenues. With a decline in copper prices in the 1980s, there was a
commensurate decrease in income and government resources. As a result, average real per capita government
education expenditure in 1996-98 was only about 73 percent of the 1990-92 level, declining further to an
average of about 60 percent of this level by 1999-2000 (World Bank data based on Government of Zambia
Financial Statements).
This economy wide decline also had an impact on educational attainment. For instance net primary
school enrollment at 72 percent is at an historically low level, having seen some decline during the previous
decade.8 Both the government and households have responded to this worsening of the education proﬁle. The
government initiated a Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Program, which along with administrative
changes in the delivery of educational services and restructuring of the teachers payroll also led to some direct
ﬁnancing of schools through cash disbursements. While household responses are harder to interpret, data on
household involvement suggests that parents are active in their children’s education with high contributions,
both in terms of expenditures and time. It is precisely this involvement that is studied below.
4.2. Sampling
The data are based on an Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey (ESDS) carried out in 182 schools in
four provinces of the country during 2002.9 The choice of schools was based on a probability-proportional-
to-size sampling scheme, where each of 35 districts in the four provinces was surveyed and schools were
randomly chosen within districts with probability weights determined by enrollment in the school. Thus,
every enrolled child in the district had an equal probability of being enrolled in a school that participated
in the survey.10
For every school, a detailed questionnaire on budgetary receipts and expenditures was completed. In
addition, as part of the expenditure tracking exercise, district and provincial educational oﬃces associated
with the surveyed schools were administered questionnaires detailing ﬁnancial activity over the year (receipts
and disbursements of cash and materials). This allows the creation of a matched data set that shows, for
every level of the hierarchy, the cash (and materials) received, as well as the amount disbursed to the level
below. Finally, at the level of the school, household questionnaires were completed for 20 randomly chosen
pupils from Grade V and Grade VI (this is just before a jump in drop-outs at the end of Grade VII and thus
fairly representative of all children in the school). The questionnaire included data on assets in the student’s
8These levels are similar to Kenya, higher than Mozambique, but below those typically attained in other Southern African
countries (see for example, UNESCO 2003). Nevertheless Zambia continues to outperform other African countries with similar
per capita income levels (Das and others 2004).
9Lusaka, Northern, Copperbelt, and Eastern provinces were surveyed. These four provinces account for 58 percent of the
total population in Zambia.
10Thus, although Zambia has high enrolment rates (above 90 percent), this survey still may not be appropriate for examining
educational outcomes such as enrollment.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 11
household and is used to create a wealth index for students in the school (see Appendix 1 for details); this
is referred to as the “School Wealth Index.”
In addition to the school survey, household surveys were administered to 540 households in 35 villages.
The choice of villages was designed to eliminate complications arising from school choice. Based on a geo-
graphical mapping of all schools, those that satisﬁed a “remoteness” criteria (deﬁned as a distance of at least
5 kms from the closest school) were chosen as starting points for villages in the household survey. From these
schools, the closest (or second closest depending on a random number) village was chosen and 15 households
were randomly chosen from households with at least one child of school-going age. These households were
administered a questionnaire detailing, among other issues, child-level expenditure on education and asset
holdings of the households. The paper refers to this data as the “remote sample” and the resulting wealth
index of households as the “household wealth index.”
4.3. Description: Schools and Households
Table 1 describes the schools in the sample disaggregated by rural, urban, and “remote” locations (the
latter forms the basis for the household sample). Reﬂecting the overall decline in this sector, schools are
under some stress. There are over 100 children for every functional classroom, student-teacher ratios are
above the Zambian guideline of 40, and there are a large number of repeaters. Moreover, for almost every
variable rural areas tend to do worse than their urban counterparts and this diﬀerence is magniﬁed in the
case of the “remote” school sample. For instance, asset holdings are one standard deviation lower in rural
and 1.2 standard deviations lower in remote villages compared to urban areas.
The main school input, cash grants (recall that in-kind receipts were particularly low with schools receiv-
ing on average less than 0.05 textbooks, 0.012 desks, 0.001 chairs and 0.01 boxes of chalk per student), can be
divided into two categories: rule-based grants received under a legislation that distributes $600 ($650 in the
case of schools with Grades 8 and 9) to every school irrespective of enrollment and discretionary grants
disbursed to schools at the discretion of the District Education Oﬃce. For all four provinces, rule-based
ﬂows are sent directly to the district and from there onwards to the schools (Figure 3). For discretionary
grants, ﬂows are directed to the province ﬁrst in the case of centralized provinces (Northern and Eastern),
but are sent directly to the district for decentralized provinces (Lusaka and Copperbelt). Thus, for both
rule-based and discretionary grants, the district oﬃce has substantial power in deciding how to allocate the
received funds.
Figure 4 explores the importance of diﬀerent funding sources for educational expenditure based on the
remote sample, disaggregated by schools that received high or low rule-based grants (with the cut-oﬀ at
the median). Household expenditures (30 percent) and rule-based cash grants (20 percent) account for a
large share of total spending on education. The other signiﬁcant component is salaries for teachers (50
percent) ; ignoring this doubles the shares of both household expenditures and rule-based cash grants. Since
households in the “remote” sample are signiﬁcantly poorer, this represents a lower bound on the actual share
of household expenditure in total funding. Hence, even in remote and poor areas, households represent an
extremely important component of educational funding and it is likely that they have suﬃcient leeway toEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 12
adjust for government subsidies received at the school level. In fact, in anticipation of the results below,
household shares decline when cash grants increase, suggesting some substitution between the two.
5. Results
To answer the questions raised in the introduction above, the results are presented in three parts. The
ﬁrst studies the extent to which executed budgets reach their intended beneﬁciaries. The second then turns
to the distributional impact of government subsidies–what percentage of disbursed cash grants were given
to the poor rather than the rich? The last presents estimates on the extent of household substitution. Using
these estimates the counterfactual distribution of educational expenditure in the absence of government
subsidies is constructed and compared to the current distribution of such expenditures.
5.1. Expenditure Tracking: What Funding Actually Reaches Schools?
On average in Zambia K 28,000 per pupil enters the educational system at the level of the province (this
does not include material ﬂows or teacher remuneration), with approximately 30 percent of this earmarked
for rule-based cash grants through the ﬁxed-school grant of $600 ($650 for schools with Grades 8 and 9),
and 70 percent in the form of funding allocated at the discretion of provinces and districts. To study the
percentage of funds disbursed to provinces/districts that actually reached schools, two diﬀerent averages are
presented. The per-student funding in each province provides an estimate of the percentage of funding that
reaches schools. Since the rule-based component of funding is a per-school amount (rather than a per-student
amount), per-school funding then shows "leakage" in the disbursement of such funds.
Table 2 (Columns 1, 2 and 3) show the funds available in the entire system, funds available at the province
level, and funds available at the district level calculated from ﬁnancial records at the provincial and district
education oﬃces. Column 4 then reports only the rule-based funds available at the district. Following the
funding ﬂow diagram (Figure 3), total funds available at the district are a combination of rule-based and
discretionary funding. Since rule-based funding is allocated on a per-school basis, districts with a larger
number of schools but the same total enrollment receive larger amounts and this is reﬂe c t e di nC o l u m n
(2) with Copperbelt and Lusaka (which have larger average school sizes) consistently reporting less than
Northern and Eastern.
Columns (5), (6) and (7) then report the total amount passed on to schools. To check for robustness, three
diﬀerent options are used to calculate this amount. Option 1 (Column 5) is a direct measurement of cash
passed on from the district to the schools in the sample and is thus only for the sample of schools covered by
the survey and for a six-month recall period. Option 2 (column (6)) is based on an examination of spending
patterns at the district during the month of May 2002. Finally, option 3 (column 7) uses data collected at
the school with a six-month recall period. The high correlation between all three measures provides some
conﬁdence in the reliability of the reported ﬁnancial data. Further, although there is some variation in the
amounts depending on the option used, Option 3 always lies between Options 1 and Option 2. One can thus
use the amount calculated from Option 1 as the upper bound of school receipts and those calculated fromEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 13
Option 2 as the corresponding lower bounds. Finally, Column (8) and (9) shows the percentage of available
funds disbursed to schools through rule-based and discretionary funds, respectively.
Option 1 (the upper bound) suggests that between 25 and 48 percent of total funding (between K 5,000
and K 13,600 per pupil) in the system is passed on to schools; Option 2 (the lower bound) suggests 11 to
33 percent (between K 2,500 and K 8,000). Typically less than one-half the funding in the system reaches
the school level; in Eastern and especially in Lusaka province, the share seems much lower.11 Moreover,
the part of funding that is passed on from rule-based grants is orders of magnitude higher than that from
discretionary grants. In all four provinces, at least 40 percent of the rule-based grants at the district level
are passed on to schools and this proportion drops to below 20 percent for discretionary grants. In general,
the amount that ﬁnally reaches schools is much less than the total amount available in the system and this
decline is the sharpest in Eastern province (Figure 5).
Instead of per-student funding, Table 3a presents funding per school. Findings on the disbursement of
rule-based components of funding are positive, with little evidence of leakage. More than 90 percent of
schools receiving the funds allocated in every province (except Lusaka), with the remainder divided equally
among those that received nothing and those that received less than the allocated amount. In both cases,
explanations relating to delays in disbursement and measurement error rather than leakage in the delivery
system are likely explanations.
Speciﬁcally, in the case of schools that have not received any cash (particularly the 28 percent in Lusaka),
actual disbursement started shortly before the survey was carried out and one possibility is that schools that
received no money were experiencing delays in disbursement (i.e., head teachers had not yet gone to the
district headquarters to receive the check) rather than the money being diverted at a higher level of the
administrative hierarchy. For the small number that report receiving less than the allotted amount (two
schools each in Eastern and Northern province) the amounts reported are between $363 and $500 and these
may reﬂect errors in reporting or recording rather than actual variation in the amounts disbursed.12 Thus,
in the case of this ﬁxed-grant allotment it would appear that the educational administration is fairly eﬃcient
and unbiased in the allocation of funding resources to schools. Given the very small numbers of schools that
had not received this funding at the time of the survey, there does not seem to be evidence of systematic
leakage of diversion of funds from the schools.
Once we turn to discretionary allocations, however, these positive results are completely altered with few
schools receiving any such funds and large variations among schools, conditional on receipt. Table 3b shows
the percentage of schools that received no funds by province–less than 30 percent receive any money at all
from discretionary sources.
11Interestingly, decentralization appears to have reduced spending at the provincial level, but there is no evidence that
increased funding to districts in decentralized provinces is passed on to schools. As a percentage of total funds in the system,
schools in centralized provinces receive around 30 percent of total funds and this actually decreases to 25 percent in the case of
decentralized provinces. Thus, in terms of funding it appears that decentralization has shifted spending from the province to
the district, with no improvement in disbursements to schools. These results need to be interpreted with some caution, since
the decentralized provinces were not randomly allocated (Copperbelt and Lusaka are very diﬀerent from Northern and Eastern
province in a number of ways).
12In four cases this was conﬁrmed through a follow-up with the Ministry of Education after 2 months.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 14
Comparing the shares of discretionary grants in school funding with the average a m o u n t so fs u c hg r a n t s
received shows that rule-based grants account for a large proportion of funding shares (88 percent), but a
much smaller proportion of average amounts (43 percent).13 This suggests that there are two distinct ways
in which schools receive cash grants. Rule-based grants tend to reach every school, thus accounting for the
large funding share of this component. Discretionary grants reach very few schools (low funding shares), but
conditional on a school receiving such funds, average amounts are likely to be large (high funding amounts).
Thus, discretionary allocations are orders of magnitude higher, ranging from six times (Copperbelt) to 30
times (Lusaka) their rule-based counterparts. However, these larger amounts do not imply that a greater
share of funding received is passed on; in fact, less than 20 percent of all discretionary funds eventually
reaches schools.
5.2. What are the Distributional Implications of Government Subsidies?
The structure of disbursements outlined above has direct implications for the targeting of government
subsidies across schools. Since schools received rule-based grants according to the allocation rule, the impact
on equity depends entirely on the relationship between school size and student wealth. If wealthier students
attend bigger schools, rule-based grants will be progressive.14 Implicit in this formulation is the assumption
that a large share of variation in student wealth is driven by diﬀerences across schools; if most variation is
within schools, the relationship between size and average wealth will be weak. For discretionary grants there
is no ex-ante result–if funds were distributed randomly, they should be distribution-neutral. Alternatively,
if wealthier schools with greater bargaining power received more the distribution will be regressive.15
Table 4 examines the underlying source of variation in student wealth. For the full sample, most of the
v a r i a t i o ni sd r i v e nb yd i ﬀerences across schools. The importance of between school diﬀerences decreases
for the rural and remote samples but remains fairly high, accounting for at least 50 percent of the total
variation in wealth. Moreover, for all schools and for rural schools only, average student wealth is positively
correlated with school size, with the wealth index increasing by one-tenth of a standard deviation for every
100 additional students (Figure 6). In the remote sample, this relationship is weaker with both the coeﬃcient
and the level of signiﬁcance dropping substantially; at the 10 percent level of conﬁdent there is no diﬀerence
in wealth across schools with diﬀerent enrollments in remote schools. Consequently, we expect rule-based
grants to be highly progressive for both the full and the rural sample, and to remain so, although at a weaker
level, for the remote sample as well.
This is conﬁrmed through concentration curves, constructed by ranking all students in schools according
to the school wealth index and plotting the cumulative share of total grants received by each decile. Formally,
13As an example, consider three schools that receive $10 each from Source 1, but while schools 1 and 2 each receive $0 from
source 2, school 3 receives $90. In this case, source 1 accounts for 70 percent of the average share, but only 25 percent of the
average amount.
14The term “progressive” means that the poorest X percent of the population receive more than X percent of total government
subsidies.
15In contrast to the literature on beneﬁt incidence, therefore, our variation is driven not by diﬀerences in access to the service
across the wealth quintile, but diﬀerences in receipts by children who are already enrolled in school. Thus, to the extent that
the poor are less likely to be enrolled than the rich, we overestimate the progressive nature of any subsidy. How big a problem
is this for primary school enrollment? Given the historically high enrollment in Zambia, diﬀerential access may not aﬀect the
estimates considerably; regression estimates on the probability of enrollment suggest that one standard deviation in the wealth
of the household increases the probability of enrollment in primary school by only 2.8 percent.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 15





so that the cumulative share is the sum of all population groups ranked below J∗ in the school wealth
ranking.
Figure 7 shows the results of this exercise for three types of government subsidies–rule-based cash grants,
discretionary cash grants and teacher remuneration. For all samples rule-based funds are progressive, with
the poorest deciles receiving more than 10 percent of the share of total rule-based grants.16 The extent
to which they are progressive depends on the sample–for the full sample, large rural-urban diﬀerences in
wealth accentuate the progressive nature of such grants. For only rural schools diﬀerences are smaller.
Turning to discretionary funding, in the full sample they are (approximately) wealth neutral, so that an
equal share of funding is received by poorer and richer students. In the rural sample, however, these funds
are regressive with a large share accruing to richer students, although this relationship is not signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level of conﬁdence.
Finally, the remuneration of teachers is regressive for the remote and the full sample, and wealth neutral
for the rural only sample. The regressive nature of teacher compensation is due to two eﬀects. First, teachers
in rural schools tend to have larger class sizes than their urban counterparts (the average class size in rural
schools is 63 compared to 42 in urban areas) and this inequality is enhanced due to larger teaching loads
for rural teachers (by teaching multiple classes). Second, rural schools also have a larger number of trainee-
t e a c h e r s( t h i sw a sas c h e m et op r o v i d et e a c h i n gs t a ﬀ in rural areas whereby trainees would be posted to
schools for one year) with lower salaries than their regular counterparts. Thus, rural teachers both tend to
have more students and are paid less, on average. Given that rural schools are also poorer, the share of
teacher funding that accrues to poorer students is smaller.
Thus, government subsidies given through rule-based grants were highly progressive due to the combi-
nation of a simple rule and the inverse relationship between student wealth and school enrollment. This
provides a partial answer to the motivating questions in the introduction: resources allocated by the central
government reach their intended beneﬁciaries if programs are well designed. Moreover, in the speciﬁcc o u n t r y
context, suﬃcient across-school variation in the student population does allow for targeting at the school to
be used as a feasible alternative for household subsidies. To complete the analysis, the next section turns to
household responses–once such responses are incorporated, what is the impact of rule-based grants on total
educational expenditure?17
16The results use the amount actually received by the school at the time of the survey.
17The focus on rule-based instead of discretionary grants follows from the dynamic implications of the model. Since rule-
based grants were arguably anticipated in the previous period, household adjustments will already have taken place. In contrast,
discretionary grants were, by their very nature, unexpected. Households would be unable to respond in the current period but
future periods would see a downward adjustment of household expenditures for those that received discretionary grants during
the current year. To abstract from these dynamic aspects, the paper focuses on current year responses for the anticipated
(rule-based) grant only. The estimation procedure for household response elasiticities draws from Das and others (2004).Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 16
5.3. How do Households Respond to Rule-Based Grants?
To study household responses, response elasticities to cash grants are estimated and these elasticities
are then be used to determine a “counterfactual” distribution of private expenditures– the distribution of
expenditures that would have ensued if government cash grants had not been available. The comparison
of this counterfactual to the current distribution shows to what extent these cash grants were successful in
reducing inequalities in overall expenditures.
To estimate household responses to rule-based cash grants, consider the following system:










lnws = γ + γ1Xi + γ2θs + ηs (12)
where zijs is (log) spending on child i in household j and school s; ws are (log) rule-based grants received in
school s, Assetsi is the household wealth index (from the household survey), and Xi are additional controls
including gender and age of the child, province dummies, and mean school and village-level wealth. Finally
µs and εij are school and child-household speciﬁc error terms.
There are two important observations. First, zijs is a censored variable–we observe positive values of
spending for children who are enrolled, but zero values for those who are not enrolled (but are eligible).
Hence a Tobit speciﬁcation is used, and estimates from a random-eﬀects Tobit model at the village level are
presented as a robustness check. Second, ws = K/enrollments,w h e r eK is the legislated amount. There is
thus a potential selection problem given by Equation (12), so that f β1 is inconsistent if cov(ηs,µ s)  =0 . Such
a problem may arise, for instance, if households in rich villages send their children to school but also spend
more on education. The coeﬃcient f β1 would then capture the diﬀerences in underlying wealth rather than a
causal response to rule-based grants. To some extent, such wealth diﬀerences are controlled for by including
three diﬀerent wealth indicators in the regression; the household wealth index, the average wealth index for
the village and the school wealth index. Nevertheless, there may be other omitted variables in Equation (10)
that lead to the inconsistent estimation of response elasticities.
To address this issue, the choice of sample is important. By restricting the sample of villages to only those
where there was no school choice, the extent of the selection problem is reduced considerably. This strategy
has been used previously by Case and Deaton (1999) and Urquiola (2001) in their studies of schooling inputs
and cognitive achievement. However, the parental choice of sending children to school could still lead to
diﬀerences in enrollment that are correlated to the error term. The paper thus explicitly checks that the
“remote” school strategy provides exogenous variation in cash grants across schools.
Using the methodology proposed by Blundell and Smith (1986), the weak exogeneity of lnws is tested.
The exclusion restriction for this test is satisﬁed if there is a variable, θs, that is correlated with lnws, but
not zijs; the size of the eligible cohort in the catchment area and the distance to school are used on theEtxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 17
assumption that these variables are correlated to enrollment, but not expenditure on the child conditional
on enrollment. The test rejects exogeneity if the coeﬃcient on the residual obtained from Equation (12) is
signiﬁcant in Equation (10) above. The inability to reject the null hypothesis establishes the exogeneity of
lnws under the assumption that the size of the eligible cohort and the distance from the school are exogenous
to household spending on children’s’ schooling.
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 5a and 5b. Columns (1) and (2) show estimated
coeﬃcients from the Tobit speciﬁcation and (3) and (4) from the analogous Tobit with random eﬀects. Table
5b then interprets these coeﬃcients as the probability of censoring and the marginal impact at the mean
conditional on the dependant variable not being censored. The results show that the estimated elasticity
of substitution for rule-based grants is always negative and signiﬁcant, ranging from -0.49 to -0.52. Finally,
the test of exogeneity cannot be rejected (Column 4, Table 5a) with the residual from the ﬁrst stage not
signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level of conﬁdence, suggesting that the estimated relationship between zijs and
ws can be given a causal interpretation.
How plausible are these results in the context of education in low-income countries? An important obser-
vation is that Zambia diﬀers considerably from other countries regarding the level of parental involvement
in children’s education. Among the households in this sample, 64 percent of respondents had attended the
last Annual General Meeting in the school, 58 percent had voted in the last Parent Teacher Association
election and 60 percent reported home visits from teachers in the school to discuss their child’s performance.
Although it would be useful to benchmark these numbers with comparable statistics from other countries, it
is likely that the households in this sample were aware of both the resources that were available in the school,
as well as the educational materials that were purchased with the money. In this context of high participation
by parents, the fact that cash grants led to the crowding-out of household educational expenditures is not
particularly surprising.
5.4. Impact on Equity of Rule-Based Grants
If the relationship in Equation (10) is causal, the counterfactual distribution in the absence of rule-
based grants, zcounter
ijs , can be arrived at by predicting expenditures when ws =0 . A slightly diﬀerent
speciﬁcation is required for this exercise. Speciﬁcally, since Equation (10) uses log spending and log grants,
the counterfactual distribution cannot be determined based on this speciﬁcation.18 Since the estimated
coeﬃcient on censoring as a result of the rule-based grants are small (suggesting that the eﬀects of such
grants on school participation were small), an analogous speciﬁcation in levels is estimated, using ws and
interactions between household assets and ws (to allow for diﬀerential responses for diﬀerent wealth levels)
as regressors. This equation is given by
zijs = α + β1ws + β2Assetsi + β3(Assetsi × ws)+β4Xi + µs + εij. (13)
To determine the counterfactual distribution, there are two options. One is to predict g zijs with ws =0and
a d da ne r r o rd r a w nf r o mad i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm o m e n t s determined from the distribution of residuals in
18Technically, the support of the distribution changes with the log speciﬁcation since Gs ∈ [0,∞] but logGs ∈ [−∞,∞].Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 18
Equation (13) above. Given the simple structure of the counterfactual, a second option is to determine this
distribution as
(g zijs|ws =0 )=zijs − f β1ws − f β3(Assetsi × ws). (14)
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e r ea r eh o u s e h o l dﬁxed-eﬀects such as µs (uncorrelated with ws) the second strategy
is an attractive alternative; the disadvantage is that the counterfactual zijs is observed for a single draw of
the error term εij. While there are no statistical means of determining the optimal strategy, it is reasonable
to assume that with cross-sectional data the second option presents a better alternative.
Once (g zijs|ws =0 ) , referred to as the “counterfactual expenditure” is computed, three diﬀerent concentra-
tion curves can be constructed: (a) the concentration curve for current household educational expenditures
based on shares of spending by diﬀerent population groups J∗ deﬁned as
S
i∈J∗ zijs S
i∈N zijs ; (b) the concentra-
tion curve for current total educational expenditures with the share of spending by group J∗ deﬁned as
S
i∈J∗(zijs+ws) S
i∈N(zijs+ws) ; and (c) the concentration curve for counterfactual household educational expenditure with




Figure 8 presents the results from this exercise. The counterfactual distribution of household expenditures
dominates that of current household expenditures with the share of every wealth quintile closer to the 450
line in the absence of cash grants from the government. Th i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h er e s u l t so ft h ee s t i m a t i o n
given by Equation (13) above whereby households in upper wealth deciles responded less to the cash grants
than those in the lower deciles.19 This worsening of inequalities in educational expenditures is somewhat
attenuated when we consider total educational expenditures (the sum of household expenditures and cash
grants), but the distribution of total expenditures continues to be dominated by that of counterfactual
expenditures (although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant). Hence, rule-based cash grants, which were highly
successful in terms of the eﬃciency of distribution as well as targeting to the poor had no impact on reducing
inequalities in overall educational expenditures in the Zambian school system.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Rule-based cash grants in Zambia were advocated through a program of educational reform and the sim-
plicity of the rule made such grants an attractive proposition–every school would receive a ﬁxed amount of
cash irrespective of enrollment. These grants were also very large. After accounting for household responses,
they represented 60 percent of educational expenditures by the household for the lowest wealth deciles and
45 percent for the top wealth decile. The simplicity of the rule ensured that the grants reached their intended
recipients, and indeed over 90 percent of schools in our survey received the grants in the earmarked fashion.
Moreover, due to an inverse relationship between school enrollment and student wealth, the grants were also
highly progressive, with the lowest decile receiving 16 percent of the total grants and the median 70 percent.
On the face of it then, these grants were very successful in both their delivery and targeting aspects.
This paper argues that such a view should be tempered by the speciﬁc objective of the social planner.
These grants undoubtedly resulted in a larger share of resources reaching the poor. Thus, if the primary
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objective of the social planner was to redistribute resources to the poor, the grants were successful–incomes
of the poor increased relative to those of the non-poor as a result of the grants. If however, the objective of
the social planner was to increase equity in overall educational expenditure, these grants were less successful.
Cash grants had the unfortunate repercussion of crowding out household educational expenditures with
the poor responding more than the rich. Consequently, the impact of these grants on overall educational
expenditure was negligible, with the share of the poorest decile remaining more or less static, irrespective of
the grant amount .
In terms of the theoretical structure presented earlier, this suggests that schools could only spend the cash
grant on inputs that were highly substitutable with household provision.20 This is borne out anecdotally.
For instance, two inputs that have impacts on schooling performance are teachers (see for instance, Hanushek
1971) and infrastructure (Glewwe and Jacoby 1994). However, in the speciﬁc country context, both these
inputs could not be provided by the school. As an example, despite the consistent complaint of understaﬃng
by head teachers, there were only two instances in which a school had tried to hire teachers on its own. In
both cases, the teachers were far less educated and trained than their government counterparts, leading to
considerable dissatisfaction among parents.
An important caveat to these results arises from the nature of the sample. While the choice of the remote
sample decreases the complexity of the estimation problem, it comes at a cost. This remote sample is very
diﬀerent from the rest of the country with much lower average wealth and lower inequality. It is likely
that responses to the grants in other parts of the country were diﬀerent from those estimated here, and a
more data-intensive exercise using household expenditures before and after the grants would yield response
elasticities other than those obtained for the remote sample. In the absence of a panel data structure, the
speciﬁc sampling strategy allowed us to deal with problems arising from school selection. Clearly this is an
issue that can be better addressed in studies with access to both pre and post-intervention data of household
expenditures linked to school inputs.
The equitable distribution of educational expenditure, though an attractive theoretical goal, requires
careful implementation on the ground. For subsidies to reach their intended recipients, the results suggest
that clearly deﬁned rule-based allocations are more likely to be successful. However, even when subsidies
are eﬃciently allocated and progressive, how they aﬀect the overall distribution of expenditure depends on
household responses. In the context of education, providing inputs that can be purchased in a competitive
market (such as textbooks) crowds out household expenditure and may not impact on educational outcomes,
except as an income subsidy. On the other hand, providing inputs that are characterized by systematic market
failures (such as monopoly provision or externalities) or that are complements to household provision will
have larger eﬀects, both on equity and educational outcomes.
20Of course, another problem with the rule-based grants as they currently stand are the dynamic incentives for schools,
whereby schools are rewarded with increased per-pupil funding if they decrease enrollment.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 20
7. Appendix 1: Description of Asset Index
Item Response Theory (IRT) methods are used to generate the asset indices. The IRT asset index per-
forms similarly to the principal components methods discussed by Filmer and Pritchett (1999). Comparisons
based on simulations carried out by the author and others show that the correlation between the IRT index
and the principal components method is more than 0.98 in the countries for which Demographic and Health
Status data is available. The main advantage of using the IRT methods is that, in addition to providing the
index, it also provides standard errors of the index at each wealth level. This then is useful in evaluating
the accuracy of the index at diﬀerent levels of wealth. The main assumption in IRT is that there is a unique
dimension (wealth) that maps to the probability of owning an asset.
Two asset indices were created for this paper. The ﬁrst is based on the assets of students in the school
surveyed. This is used (for instance) in the construction of concentration curves for the full sample. The
second asset index is created for the household sample using the survey of households. Table A.1 shows the
components used for the asset index at the household level. Table A.2 shows components used for the asset
index at the school level. For the school sample, fewer assets are available for the exercise. On the whole,
the wealth index is reasonably accurate in the range of the sample: Copperbelt comes out as the richest
province, followed by Lusaka, Northern, and Eastern. Further, the index was much higher for children going
to private schools. Figure A.1 for instance, presents the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the index for the
household sample.Etxlw| lq Egxfdwlrqdo E{shqglwxuhv:C dq Gryhuqphqw Sxevlglhv Hhos? 21
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Figure 2: Concentration Curves Based on CES Production Functions  
 
Note: This figure shows how the distribution of overall expenditure is affected by subsidies at the school level for production 
functions with different elasticity of substitution. Every point on a curve represents the share of total expenditure that is spent by 
the corresponding income decile and the diagonal is the line of perfect equality where every quintile spends exactly 5 percent of 
the total. The simulations are based on normally distributed wealth with mean 5,000 and standard deviation 1,000, so that w = 
1,000 corresponds to 20 percent of income. The alphabet “a” represents the elasticity of substitution, so that higher values 
represent higher substitutability between school and household inputs.  
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Note: This stylized diagram shows how funds flow through the administrative hierarchy. Funds are divided into two categories—
discretionary grants and rule-based grants. In both centralized and decentralized provinces, rule-based grants are sent directly to 
the district and from there onward to schools. Discretionary grants are sent to provinces first in centralized provinces, and to 
districts directly in decentralized provinces.  
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Figure 4: Household Expenditures and School Funding 
 
Note:  The pie chart shows how educational inputs are funded in schools that received high/low anticipated funds. The shares are 
computed as the average of shares across schools. Teacher’s Salary is computed as salary divided by the number of students in 
the teacher’s class. This is computed for a sample of teachers who were interviewed if they were either currently teaching Grade 
VI or Grade V students, or had taught Grade V students in the previous year. The particular sample was chosen to ensure that 
teacher characteristics could be matched to students who were tested in both years. Salaries will therefore be biased if there is 
selection of teachers into different grade levels. Household expenditure is based on a one-year recall question of household 
educational expenditure for every child on various items including textbooks, school supplies, and uniforms. Discretionary funds 
are unanticipated by households.  
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Figure 5: Funding Disbursement in Zambia 




































































Funds at Each Administrative Level




































































Funds at Each Administrative Level
 
Note: This figure shows how funds flow through each level of the administrative hierarchy. Total funds are the sum of funds that 
reach either the province or the district. (LB) and (UB) correspond to the upper bound and lower bound of funds that eventually 
reached schools. In decentralized provinces more funds are available at the district compared to the province due to the direct 
funding of districts from the Ministry of Education. Per-pupil funding is higher in the centralized provinces due to the larger 
number of small schools, combined with the structure of the rule-based allocation.  
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Figure 6: The Relationship between Wealth and Enrollment 
 
Note: This graph shows the relationship between student wealth and school enrollment. Student wealth is based on a survey of 
household assets administered to 20 randomly selected students from Grade V and VI; school enrollment is based on school 
census data from the Ministry of Education and the Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey data. For details on the construction 
of the asset index, see Appendix 1. For each sample, a quadratic relationship is fitted to the scatter of enrollment and wealth. 
Linear regression results suggest that student wealth is highly correlated with enrollment in the full sample and the rural sample, 
but not in the remote sample.  
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Figure 7: Concentration Curves for School Funding 
 
Note: This figure shows concentration curves (the share of total expenditure for every wealth decile) for government subsidies. 
The wealth decile is computed using Item Response Theory, details are in Appendix 1. Rule-based and discretionary funds are 
calculated as the ratio of funds received at the school level to school enrollment; teacher remuneration is based on a survey of all 
teachers of Grade V and VI in the surveyed schools and includes salary and allowances received in the previous month. This 
amount is then divided by the total number of children taught by the teacher. To the extent that these teachers are not 
representative of all teachers (for instance, better and higher paid teachers may be assigned to higher classes) the averages may 




Figure 8: Inequality in Total Educational Expenditure 
 
Note: This figure shows concentration curves for counterfactual and observed distributions of educational expenditure. The 
dashed line (HH Expenditures (Current)) corresponds to the observed distribution of expenditures on children’s education. The 
dotted line (HH Expenditures (counter)) shows the distribution that would have obtained if the rule-based grants were zero. The 
dashed-dotted line (Total Expenditure (HH + Funds)) shows the total observed expenditure including rule-based funds and the 
solid line shows rule-based funds. The graph is based on an underlying OLS estimation of expenditure that includes the rule-
based funds, household wealth index, an interaction term between rule-based funds and the household wealth index, the age and 
gender of the child, and mean village and school assets. The sample is restricted only to those children who are currently 
attending school with the assumption that the size of the grant does not change enrollment status.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey Data.  
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 Figure A.1: Asset Index Standard Errors 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the histogram of the household wealth index and the 90 percent confidence intervals from the item 







Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: School Enrollment and Staffing 
 
Category Variable Urban  Rural 
“Remote” schools 
(HH Sample) 











(40.91)  Basic indicators 
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   a. Pass-Rates are for the Grade VII examination administered to all students by the Examination Council 
of Zambia. 
b. The wealth index is based on a weighted aggregation of household assets similar to a principal 
components analysis, but with weights optimally derived to minimize classification errors. Details are in 
Appendix 1 of the text. 




Table 2: Tracking Resources from District to Schools, 2001–2002  
(enrollment weighted Kwacha per pupil) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
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Note: Percentages of total funds in brackets. Data exclude two schools in Kafue district, with substantial 
reported grants not reflected in district data, and most likely outliers linked to measurement problems. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) are funds in the system, funds at the province level and total funds at the district 
level. Column (4) are only the rule-based funds received by the district. Column (5) reported by district, 
extrapolated from a recall period Jan 2002–July 2002 and from data specifically related to the Zambian 
Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey sample of schools explicitly asking how much cash was allocated 
to each school in our sample (for recurrent and capital expenditures). Column (6) reported by district, 
extrapolated from actual spending data for May 2002. Column (7) based on data collected at the schools 
level, recall period January 2002–June 2002. Column (8) and Column (9) report the percentage of total 
rule-based and discretionary funds that schools receive out funds available at the province and district 
levels. (




Table 3a: Disbursement of the Fixed-Grant Allocation 
 Centralized  provinces  Decentralized provinces 
Rule-based funds  Northern  Eastern  Copperbelt  Lusaka 
Percent receiving either $600 or $650  90.39  94.87  94.12  71.3 
Percent receiving nothing  5.77  0  5.88  28.57 
Percent receiving less than $600  3.84  5.13  0  0 
Source: Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey data. 
 












Fixed grant allocation  5.7  0.00  5.88  28.57  10.93 
Case I-III donor pool 
and domestic 
sources 
94.2 94.8 80.00  89.1  89.2 
Case IV pool: PAGE  71.15  97.44  100.00  97.06  90.66 
Case IV pool: other 
sources 
98.00 92.31 96.00  85.29  93.96 
Discretionary 
funding 
Other sources  98.00  97.44  98.00  85.29  95.60 




Table 4: Decomposing Variation in Wealth Within and between Schools 
(percent) 














Asset  index  34.30 55.50 49.30 65.70 44.40 50.70 
Random variation  94.20  94.80  92.10  5.70  5.10  7.90 
Note: The decomposition is based on the asset index described in Appendix 1. The second row, random 
variation, shows the decomposition if wealth were distributed randomly, and provides a benchmark 
comparison given the small sample sizes in the schools. For the random variation, wealth was assumed to 
be normally distributed with the same mean and standard deviation as the asset index. 
Source: Expenditure and Service Delivery Survey data.  
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Table 5a: Relationship between Household and School Funding   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tobit  specification 
Tobit with random 
effects 
Test of weak 
exogeneity: Tobit 









































































Observations  1,410 1,410 1,410 1,410 
Note: The regressions in this table show the effect of anticipated and unanticipated funding on children’s educational 
expenditures (the dependant variable in all regressions). Estimates marked ** are significant at 1 percent, * denotes 
significance at 5 percent and standard errors are presented in [brackets]. Columns (1) and (2) present the estimates from 
the Tobit and the random-effects Tobit specificatons. Columns (3) and (4) present the test of weak exogeneity (Blundell 
and Smith, 1986) where the residual from the first stage regression determining log anticipated funds is included as an 
additional regressor. All regressions control for the mean wealth of students in the school, province dummies and a 
rural dummy. The censoring is at 0 for the Tobit and the random effects Tobit specifications account for the clustering 
of errors at the level of the village. Marginal effects (conditional on being uncensored) and the probability of censoring 
are presented in Table 5b.  
a.  For all regressions, K100 is added to zero values of discretionary funding to allow logs. The minimum funding is 
K900 conditional on receipt 
b.  Two private schools are excluded from the analysis. 
c.  K50 is added to enrolled children with zero educational expenditures who form 4.96 percent of the sample 
d.  The wealth index is  based on optimal maximum likelihood weights (see Appendix 1). Results are robust to 




Table 5b: Marginal Effects and Probability of Censoring 
 (1)  (2) 
  Tobit specification  Tobit with random effects 


























Note: This table shows the marginal effects at mean values of the regressors based on the coefficients from Table 5a. In 
all cases, the significance of estimated coefficients is robust to clustering at the village level.   
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A.1: Asset Items for  Household Wealth Index 
Asset number (for graphs)  Descriptions of asset  Used for 
Item1  Is house made of brick?  All sample 
Item2  Does house have electricity?  All sample 
Item3  Does  household own TV?  All sample 
Item4  Does household own radio-cassette?  All sample 
Item5  Does household own radio?  All sample 
Item6  Does household own video?  All sample 
Item7  Does household own sewing 
machine? 
All sample 
Item8  Does household own stove/cooker?  All sample 
Item9  Does household own fridge/freezer?  All sample 
Item10  Does household use plough?  Rural only 
Item11  Does household use crop sprayer?  Rural only 
Item12  Does household use hammer mill?  Rural only 
Item13  Does household use hand-grinding 
mill? 
Rural only 
Item14  Does household use tractor?  Rural only 
Item15  Does household own cattle?  Rural only 
Item16  Does household own goats/sheep?  Rural only 
 
A.2: Asset Item for School Wealth Index 
Asset number   Descriptions of asset  Used for 
Item1  Is house made of brick?  All sample 
Item2  Does house have electricity?  All sample 
Item3  Does  household own TV?  All sample 
Item4  Does household own radio-cassette?  All sample 
Item5  Does household own radio?  All sample 
Item6  Does household own video?  All sample 
Item7  Does household own sewing 
machine? 
All sample 
Item8  Does household own stove/cooker?  All sample 
Item9  Does household own fridge/freezer?  All sample 
 
 